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1 Introduction
Old-boy networks are informal groupings of individuals who provide favorable referrals
about co-members to third parties such as resource providers. One can think of many ways
that such informal networks arise and perpetuate themselves, through personal and business
interactions. Those outside the network do not enjoy these benets and so may be disad-
vantaged  a well-known criticism of old-boy networks (Taylor, 2000). If informal networks
reveal information that would otherwise remain hidden, there may be far-reaching impli-
cations for the nature of equilibria which arise under asymmetric information, potentially
a¤ecting e¢ ciency and welfare (Bac and Inci, 2010). For example, even some insiders may
become disadvantaged in the end.
Informal networks are distinct from formal networks (see Parker, 2008 for an analysis of
the latter) in that they are neither o¢ cially recognized nor mandated as organizations in
their own right and that their membership cannot be observed by outsiders. Unlike formal
networks, which may be bound by legal governance structures that encourage transparency
of communication, informal networks face no formal restrictions and may be able to convey
a richer array of information to third parties. This is precisely the set-up we study in this
paper in the particular context of entrepreneurial nance.
We develop a model comprising two hidden entrepreneurial types who both apply for
external nance and whose risky project returns are ranked by rst-order stochastic domi-
nance à la de Meza and Webb (1987). Finance is provided either by banks or local nanciers.
An old-boy network conveys imprecise but informative signals to local nanciers about the
hidden types of its network members (which we call an old-boy mechanism), which are re-
ected in di¤erent loan contract terms. The network is initially exogenous and we ask a
fundamental question: do all network entrepreneurs actually benet from being members of
the network? The answer turns out to be a qualied yes: high-type entrepreneurs always
benet, but low-type entrepreneurs only do so (i) if the network signals are not su¢ ciently
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informative, (ii) if the network is small in terms of number of members, (iii) if there are
relatively few high-type entrepreneurs in the economy.
The intuition for these results goes as follows. The cross-subsidization induced by the
contractual structure of the credit market results in undervaluation of the start-ups of high-
type entrepreneurs and overvaluation of the start-ups of low-type entrepreneurs. The old-boy
mechanism alters the degrees of under- and over-valuations in the market. High-type entre-
preneurs are always better o¤ with the old-boy mechanism because signals are informative
and thus they are more likely to be correctly identied by the network, in which case they
are o¤ered lower lending interest rates.
The situation is di¤erent for low-type entrepreneurs, who always want to mimic their
high-type counterparts. All else equal, they prefer the old-boy mechanism when the network
signals are not su¢ ciently informative so that they can have a higher chance of not being
correctly identied. All else equal, they also want to be in a smaller network, because their
payo¤ is the same regardless of the size of the network if they are not correctly identied,
but if they are correctly identied and left out of the network, the fraction of high-type
entrepreneurs will be relatively larger outside the network when the network is small and
they have positive externalities on the loan prices o¤ered to low-type entrepreneurs. Thus,
while the upside benet of being in the network remains the same, the downside is relatively
less important when the network is small. Once the network becomes su¢ ciently small, then
low-type entrepreneurs prefer the old-boy mechanism over the no-network regime.
Finally, all else equal, a low-type entrepreneur prefers the old-boy mechanism when the
fraction of high-type entrepreneurs in the society is su¢ ciently low. Having a lower fraction
of high-type entrepreneurs has both upsides and downsides to low-type entrepreneurs. The
upside is that they may not be correctly identied in which case their projects are going to
be even more overvalued in such a society. The downside is that they might be correctly
identied in which case the lending interest rate is going to be higher for low types. However,
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because the fraction of high-type entrepreneurs is already low enough, this outcome is not
so much di¤erent than the case in which there is no old-boy mechanism operating in the
market. Thus, the upside is relatively more important than the downside in expected payo¤
when the fraction of high-type entrepreneurs in the society is su¢ ciently low.
If low-type entrepreneurs do not benet from the old-boy mechanism, do they lose more
than their high-type counterparts gain  and if so, can they prevent the old-boy mechanism
from operating? We nd the answers to both questions are negative. The crucial point here
is that when the network is su¢ ciently small, both high- and low-type entrepreneurs prefer
the old-boy mechanism and side payments promised by them can be su¢ cient incentives for
the network owner to organize it. When the network is large, there is conict of interest
between the di¤erent types. Yet, we show that the maximum amount of side payments that
high-type entrepreneurs are willing and able to pay to the network owner is higher than
that of their low-type counterparts. This implies that there are incentives for the network
owner to form the old-boy mechanism in this case, too.1 Even in such a situation, low-type
entrepreneurs do not want to leave the network but rather cripple its information mechanism.
They know that the network will form anyway as a result of high-type entrepreneursside
payments and thus they want to be network members in any case to keep their chance of
being not correctly identied. Finally, we show that our results are robust to the existence of
network operating costs and a device (co-nancing by networks) to establish the credibility
of the signals.
All the results reported so far are established in a model in which the network is exoge-
nous, and this exogenous network model highlights the important e¤ects clearly. However,
1To be precise, we demonstrate the existence of market incentives to engage in information extraction.
As long as some kind of excess value is created as a result of the old-boy mechanism, it will be exploited in
some way or another. The side payments are not necessarily bribes or anything that sort. They may take
various forms. For example, network entrepreneurs can sell a share of their start-ups to the network owner
which may well be realized under market prices. There are many other examples of transactions occurring
under the market prices in the interlinkage literature (see Ray, 1998). For example, landlords lend money
to their tenants, and tenants repay it by working for the landlords at lower wage rates than their marginal
productivity.
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in this model, the network owner has an exogenous referral policy of revealing information
about only the entrepreneurs with good signals. To show the generality of our result, we
then endogenize network formation by allowing entrepreneurs to di¤er in their networking
costs. We show that not only is our assumed network structure sound, but also the assumed
referral policy is in fact optimal for the network owner when its objective is to maximize the
total welfare of its members.
The endogenous network model also clearly shows that networks can form even though
they are ine¢ cient. The intuition goes as follows. Because all projects have positive net value,
it is e¢ cient to nance all entrepreneurs even when there is no network. The network forms
only because its members enjoy private gains via nancing through the old-boy mechanism,
which is a purely redistributive gain. Thus, the fact that entrepreneurs incur networking
costs is ine¢ cient from the point of view of the society because all who should be nanced
would have been nanced even in the absence of a network. Moreover, the network in our
setting is not nepotistic in the sense of conveying untruthful signals about network members;
so, our results cannot be attributable to nepotism. Finally, making the costs vary among
entrepreneurs shows that even some of the high-type network entrepreneurs can be losers
due to the old-boy mechanism.
While informal networks are well-known in sociology, they have been less widely studied
in economics (see Scott (1991) for a sociological inquiry into informal networks, and Ioannides
and Loury (2004) for a survey on the role of social networks in labor markets). This paper
adds to a small but growing economics literature on entrepreneurial networks. Parker (2008)
focuses on the private and social benets generated by business networks, and analyzes
aspects of optimal network design. He shows that in general networks are generally too
small to maximize social welfare. However, his paper deals with formal rather than informal
networks, and does not discuss the role of start-up nance.
Bac and Inci (2010) explore the welfare implications of informal networks in a setting
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where entrepreneurs seek external nance and types are endogenous. Although they do not
analyze di¤erent incentives for entrepreneurs to join networks  the subject of the present
paper  it is noteworthy that they too establish potentially negative impacts from network
organizations which are commonly assumed to be unambiguously positive. In Bac and Inci
(2010), an entrepreneur chooses between remaining a low type and becoming a high type
by providing e¤ort. The network outcome can be ine¢ cient because too few entrepreneurs
may choose to become high types as compared with the no network outcome. Because the
overall type distribution is xed throughout the current paper, the ine¢ ciency of the network
outcome occurs for a di¤erent reason than Bac and Inci (2010). Saloner (1985) looks at a
similar problem. In his setting, intermediaries decide whom to recommend from a group of
individuals about whom they have private information. Then, the employer makes decisions
based on his expectation about the quality of both the recommended and unrecommended
applicants, which resembles the functioning of the credit market in our setting.
We do not claim that social networks provide no benets to their members. Indeed, there
is evidence that they do, with Nanda and Khanna (2010) nding that Indian entrepreneurs
who lived abroad obtain easier access to nance when they move back to India, by virtue of
being able to tap cross-border networks. Instead, our point is that there are losersas well
as winnersfrom networks, owing to the separation of heterogeneous types which potentially
undoes a cross-subsidization between those types; and it is by no means obvious a priori
that the winners win more than the losers lose.
We do not claim that informal networks are the only information channels between entre-
preneurs and their nanciers. For instance, there is a well-established literature discussing
how informed venture capital can overcome information asymmetries by monitoring, allo-
cating control rights and staging capital to entrepreneurs (see, for example, Bergemann and
Hege, 1998; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001). In fact, some re-
searchers argue that these mechanisms are unsuitable for resolving contracting problems in
early stage start-ups, where social ties and social norms of fairness and obligation may be
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more important (Shane and Cable, 2002). While the informal networks we study do leverage
social ties, they do so without resorting to direct investment by either business angels (Am-
atucci and Sohl, 2007) or what Nofsinger and Wang (2011) refer to as informal investors.
Thus, the types of networks we study are distinct from, and complementary to, alternative
sources of entrepreneurial nancing studies in prior literature. An important contribution
of our paper is to show that even though they do not act as investors themselves, informal
networks still impact the e¢ ciency of credit markets.
Our results carry some interesting implications for contracting under asymmetric infor-
mation. It is commonly believed in the literature that there are no motives for third parties
to engage in information extraction in simple market regimes with information asymmetries.
The intuition for this claim goes as follows. When there is pooling equilibrium in the credit
markets  which is the case in this paper  the market overvalues the start-ups of low-type
entrepreneurs and undervalues the start-ups of high-type entrepreneurs. Given perfect (or
Bertrand) competition among lenders and regular pooling contracts, the level of over- and
undervaluation exactly matches each other in the aggregate. Thus, in equilibrium, there
cannot be market incentives for a third partyto engage in information extraction in this
simple market regime (see Campbell and Kracaw (1980) for this line of reasoning). Our
results show that this claim is overruled when there is a network organization because then
the network owner as a third party has market incentives to decrease the information gap
between entrepreneurs and their nanciers.
Numerous prior studies have explored how various contracting devices can break pooling
equilibria and induce separating equilibria which mitigate adverse selection or moral hazard
(e.g., collateral (Bester, 1985), restrictions on limited liability (Chamley, 1983), forfeiture
and anti-dilution provisions (Diamond, 1993) and education (Orzach and Tauman, 2005)). A
common feature of these studies is their claim that contracting devices can enhance e¢ ciency.
It is, therefore, interesting to ask how the device of informal networks compares in this regard.
Although there is no ex ante ine¢ ciency in the model we analyze, it turns out that informal
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networks can introduce ine¢ ciency in the form of wasteful networking costs.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 outlines the model
and analyzes nancing arrangements in the absence of an informal network. Section 3
analyzes nancing arrangements in the presence of an exogenous informal network. Section 4
determines the winners and losers due to the old-boy mechanism. Section 5 endogenizes the
informal network for the case where entrepreneurs choose whether to incur networking costs
to join the network and the network owner chooses what types of signal to convey to local
nanciers. Section 6 concludes. An appendix contains proofs and extensions.
2 The model
We consider a unit mass of risk-neutral entrepreneurs, each of whom is endowed with a
start-up project that requires one unit of start-up capital. For simplicity, we assume that
entrepreneurs have no wealth. Therefore, they need to borrow the start-up capital from
a lender. There is also a network formed by an established hub rm.  2 (0; 1) of the
entrepreneurs are in the network (network entrepreneurs) and 1   of them are outside the
network (stand-alone entrepreneurs). To start with, we take  to be xed and exogenous,
but we endogenize it in Section 5.
The network is informal and thus a¢ liation is not directly observable by lenders.2 Mem-
bers of such networks incur networking costs, which may be interpreted as resources that
must be expended in order to build the social relationships, which provide access to informal
networks. For example, entrepreneurs might have to spend time and money attending ex-
clusive social functions and sponsoring events in order to become and remain known among
2Technically, we assume a star network structure among the hub rm and entrepreneurs. As evidenced
by Lamoreaux et al. (2007), agglomerations can often be tracked down to one or two hub rms that act as
incubators for new rms. For simplicity, we assume that there is one such rm. The analysis can easily be
generalized to a case in which there are more than one hub rm. However, there is no harm in perceiving the
hub rm as a representative of all hub rms for our purpose in this paper, just as we do with a representative
consumer in consumption theory.
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inuential decision makers. This section, and the one after, abstracts from such network-
ing costs, but they are introduced in Section 4, where we treat them as a xed monetary
payment, c, incurred by all network entrepreneurs. Section 5 relaxes this assumption by
allowing networking costs to vary among entrepreneurs.
There are two di¤erent kinds of start-up projects. A good (high success probability)
project succeeds with probability pH 2 (0; 1) whereas a not-so-good (low success probability)
project succeeds with probability pL < pH . An entrepreneur who is endowed with a good
(not-so-good) project is called a high-type (low-type) entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs privately
know their types, but the distribution of types is common knowledge within and outside
the network. High-type entrepreneurs make up a  2 (0; 1) fraction of each population.3
Given this, there are  high-type network entrepreneurs and (1   ) low-type network
entrepreneurs. The corresponding numbers for stand-alone entrepreneurs are (1   ) and
(1  )(1  ), respectively.
A project yields Y units of capital in the case of success, and zero in the case of failure.
With our specications, the projects are ranked according to their expected payo¤s, as in
standard de Meza and Webb (1987) class of credit market models. The cost of loanable funds
is equal to the risk-free (gross) interest rate R in the economy. All projects have positive net
value, which is stated in the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Net Values of Projects) pHY > pLY > R.
That is why we name projects goodand not-so-goodrather than goodand bad.
Therefore, it is not only the case that all entrepreneurs would prefer to undertake their
projects had they been able to fully self-nance them, but also that lenders would prefer
nancing all projects. If we assume, instead, that not-so-good projects have negative net
3Our results remain qualitatively the same even when the network comprises a higher fraction of high-
type entrepreneurs than outside it. See Appendix B.1 for such an extension.
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values, there will be cases in which the credit market shuts down for some group of entre-
preneurs as in Akerlof-type models, and this leads to extreme (but trivial) versions of our
results. The focus of this paper is not on the ine¢ ciencies that arise because of the lemons
problem in the credit market, but rather on the pricing problem of di¤erent projects and the
resulting incentive scheme that may induce the construction of a network.4
The lenders are risk neutral and they are in Bertrand competition with each other. They
can be either banks or local nanciers. These two types of lenders are identical in all respects
except the information they are privy to. They form their beliefs simultaneously and choose
the contracts they will o¤er taking as given the cost of loanable funds. For the moment, we
assume that both banks and local nanciers have the same information set. Later, we will
allow local nanciers to make use of local information available from the hub rm.
Loan contracts are contingent on the announced type and the project outcome (either
success or failure). They specify the repayments to the lenders for both outcomes. Let the
repayment be DSi (R) in the success state and D
F
i (R) in the failure state, where S stands for
success and F for failure, and i = fH;Lg is the type of the entrepreneur. We assume that
there is limited liability, and therefore, contracts cannot leave entrepreneurs with negative
end-of-period payo¤s.
An entrepreneur is successful with probability pi in which case she produces Y and gives
DSi of it to the bank. In the case of failure, the entrepreneur produces something less than
Y (which is normalized to zero) and gives DFi of it to the bank. However, limited liability
prevents DFi from being higher than what the entrepreneur has. Since the low output is
normalized to zero, it follows immediately that DFi = 0 as well. Consequently, the expected
payo¤ of an entrepreneur at the beginning of the period, i, is given by
i = pi(Y  DSi (R))  0 8i 2 fH;Lg : (1)
4Inci (2006) focuses on such ine¢ ciencies by assuming that not-so-good projects have negative net value.
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The sequence of events is as follows. First, the hub rm receives good signals about some
fraction of the network entrepreneurs. It gets no signal about the rest of them. Those who
get good signals are mentioned to the local nanciers who will eventually nance them.5
However, as will become clear later, those who are not able to produce signals will apply for
loans as if they were stand-alone entrepreneurs. Next, entrepreneurs sign nancial contracts
with lenders and make their investments. Finally, successful entrepreneurs pay o¤ their loans
once their payo¤s are realized.
We use the standard Bertrand-Nash equilibrium concept. Each lender o¤ers entrepre-
neurs a contract that maximizes its prots. Then, among all alternatives, entrepreneurs
choose the best contract for them. Under these conditions, it is impossible to design con-
tracts such that di¤erent types of entrepreneurs self-select themselves into di¤erent contracts
unless we drop the limited liability assumption.6 In other words, it is impossible to identify
which entrepreneurs are high types since it is always benecial for a low-type entrepreneur
to misrepresent herself as having a good project. In the absence of a network, the outcome
is therefore a pooling equilibrium, where7
DSH(R) = D
S
L(R) = D
S =
R
p
; DFH(R) = D
F
L (R) = D
F = 0 ; (2)
and
p = pH + (1  )pL : (3)
Note that @p=@ > 0. This equilibrium pooling contract takes the simple debt form with a
repayment of R=p in the success state and zero repayment in the failure state. The e¤ective
5Section 5 endogenizes the hub rms signal referral policy.
6Dropping the limited liability assumption would result in pound of eshcontracts that require asking
for something that an entrepreneur does not have.
7Semi-pooling contracts would also be possible if not-so-good projects had negative net value, but this is
ruled out by Assumption 1. In a semi-pooling loan market equilibrium, all high-type entrepreneurs but only
a fraction of low-type entrepreneurs participate in the loan market until the lending interest rate becomes
so high that low-type entrepreneurs make zero expected prots whether they take a loan or not. See Bac
and Inci (2010) for an analysis of such semi-pooling contracts.
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interest rate implied by this contract is R=p.
3 Local nanciers and the old-boy mechanism
We now turn to the case where the hub rm has a role in start-up nancing, retaining for
now the assumption that a network is already in place. We also continue to abstract for
now from networking costs borne by entrepreneurs. Remember that the hub rm gets a
good signal about the type of some network entrepreneurs but no signal about the rest. We
assume that this information is costless and comes naturally due to interaction between the
parties. The hub rm has close links with local nanciers, too. These links can be the result
of ongoing or past nancial relationships. The crucial point is that the hub rm can share
its information with local nanciers, as evidenced in Lamoreaux et al. (2007).
Let  be hub rms information.  = 1 if it gets a good signal about a network entre-
preneur and  = 0 if it gets no signal about the entrepreneur. Receiving a signal about
a particular network entrepreneur (or not receiving it) allows the hub rm to form its be-
liefs about each network entrepreneur. The probability of a good signal for a high-type
entrepreneur is x 2 (0; 1) and that for a low-type entrepreneur is y 2 (0; 1).
Denote the set of network entrepreneurs byN . Conditional on a good signal, the Bayesian
probability that a loan applicant is a high-type entrepreneur is
Prfi = H j  = 1 ^ i 2 Ng = x
x+ (1  )y ; (4)
and conditional on not getting a signal, the Bayesian probability that a loan applicant is a
high-type entrepreneur is
Prfi = H j  = 0 ^ i 2 Ng = (1  x)
(1  x) + (1  )(1  y) : (5)
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Similar expressions for the Bayesian probabilities that a loan applicant is a low-type entre-
preneur are given by
Prfi = L j  = 1 ^ i 2 Ng = (1  )y
x+ (1  )y (6)
Prfi = L j  = 0 ^ i 2 Ng = (1  )(1  y)
(1  x) + (1  )(1  y) : (7)
The signal structure is imperfect because the hub rm does not receive a signal about
a high-type entrepreneur with probability 1   x, and it receives a good signal about a low-
type entrepreneur with probability y. However, we assume that the signals are useful on
average. Technically, this is achieved if the monotone likelihood ratio property holds for
the distribution of types. For this simple model, this requires the ratio of the Bayesian
probability of a good signal to no signal to be increasing with the type of the entrepreneur.
That is, the fact that the ratio (4)=(5) is greater than the ratio (6)=(7) should hold, which
boils down to the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (Informativeness of Signals) Signals are informative: x > y.
The entrepreneurs getting good signals are mentioned to at least two local nanciers who
trust the beliefs of the hub rm.8 This information is private between the hub rm and
the local nanciers and cannot be credibly communicated to anyone else. As a result, local
nanciers have access to the local information that a bank cannot gather. However, local
nanciers do know that the hub rm has contacts with other local nanciers, too. We also
assume that the hub rm communicates the good signals to the local nanciers honestly.9
8Observing an entrepreneur without a signal is, of course, informative in its own right and could alter-
natively be labeled as a bad signal. The crucial assumption here is that the hub rm shares only the good
signals with the local nanciers. This rules out the possibility of nanciers distinguishing between stand-
alone entrepreneurs and network entrepreneurs with bad signals, which is quite realistic given that network
membership is not observable by outsiders. Section 5 shows that this referral policy is in fact optimal for
the hub rm if its objective is to maximize the total welfare of network members.
9Appendix B.2 discusses how to guarantee the reliability of signals.
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In the case where there is no old-boy mechanism, the average success probability of the
loan applicant pool is given by p, and as is shown in (2), the equilibrium lending interest
rate is R=p for any loan granted. However, the extra information that the local nanciers
receive enables them to price discriminate between network entrepreneurs with good signals
and the rest.
The average success probability of network entrepreneurs with good signals, p^, is
p^ =
xpH + (1  )ypL
x+ (1  )y : (8)
Note that @p^=@ > 0. A similar analysis that of the previous section, but with new (Bayesian)
incentive constraints and (Bayesian) zero-prot conditions shows that local nanciers o¤er
a lending interest rate of R=p^ to any network entrepreneur with a good signal. A simple
comparison of (3) and (8) shows that p^ > p as long as x > y, which holds by Assumption 2.
Therefore, the existence of a network allows local nanciers to provide cheaper loans to
network entrepreneurs with good signals.
The average success probability of the stand-alone loan applicants is p. However, network
membership is not observable by banks, and local nanciers are made aware of only the
entrepreneurs with good signals. Thus, network entrepreneurs who did not get a good
signal will apply for loans as if they were stand-alone entrepreneurs. This changes the
average success probability of the stand-alone loan applicants. Knowing this, banks and
local nanciers price their loans accordingly. The new average success probability outside
the network is now given by
~p =
(1  x)pH + (1  y)(1  )pL
(1  x) + (1  y)(1  ) : (9)
It is easy to show that ~p < p, @~p=@ < 0, and @~p=@ > 0. The reason for ~p < p is the
following. The average success probability of the whole population is p. A portion of this
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population, which has an average success probability of p^ > p, is in the network. Therefore,
the average success probability of the remaining population has to be less than p.
4 Winners and losers in the old-boy network
Continuing for now to take the existence of an old-boy network as exogenous, we can now ask
whether all entrepreneurs benet equally from such a network, or whether some entrepreneurs
benet while others are disadvantaged. We show that the answer depends on several network
characteristics, including its size. If the network is small, all network entrepreneurs are
winners. If the network is large, high-type network entrepreneurs are winners while their
low-type counterparts are losers; but the former gain more than the latter lose. Thus,
whether the network is large or small, the network can be maintained. This means that
network members are even willing to incur a networking cost to separate themselves from
non-members to obtain a purely redistributive gain. This is, however, ine¢ cient from the
viewpoint of society, because, whether there is a network or not, all projects are nanced in
this model anyway, but a wasteful networking cost is incurred by network members in the
former.
Continuing to abstract from networking costs momentarily, note that in the presence of
asymmetric information, credit markets undervalue the start-ups of high-type entrepreneurs
while they overvalue the start-ups of low-type entrepreneurs. From an ex ante point of view,
in the absence of an old-boy mechanism, the value of a start-up is
Vi = pi

Y   RI
p

8i = fH;Lg ; (10)
for a type i entrepreneur.
The old-boy mechanism changes the levels of under- and overvaluation of start-ups. Now,
a high-type entrepreneur gets a good signal with probability x, in which case she stays in
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the network, is o¤ered a lending interest rate of R=p^, and produces Y units if successful.
However, in the failure state, which happens with probability 1  x, she gets no signal and
as a result is left out of the network. In such a case, she is o¤ered a lending interest rate
of R=~p, which is higher than R=p^. Consequently, when there is an old-boy mechanism, the
value of the start-up of a high-type network entrepreneur, VH , is
VH = xpH

Y   R
p^

+ (1  x)pH

Y   R
~p

: (11)
Similarly, the value of the start-up of a low-type network entrepreneur, VL, is
VL = ypL

Y   R
p^

+ (1  y)pL

Y   R
~p

: (12)
Given that the distribution of types within and outside the network are the same, an
entrepreneurs decision between network membership and standing alone is found by com-
paring VH with VH and VL with VL. The following proposition proves that a high-type
network entrepreneur always prefers the old-boy mechanism, but the preference of a low-
type network entrepreneur depends on the informativeness of the signals, the network size,
and the fraction of high-type network entrepreneurs.
Proposition 1 (Entrepreneurs Decision) a) A high-type network entrepreneur always
prefers the old-boy mechanism. b) A low-type network entrepreneur prefers the old-boy mech-
anism when
1. the signals are not su¢ ciently informative, given the network size and the fraction of
high-type entrepreneurs:
x
y
<
pH + (1  )(1  )pL
pH
; (13)
2. the network is su¢ ciently small, given the signal structure and the fraction of high-type
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entrepreneurs:
 <
y(pH + (1  )pL)
xpH + (1  )ypL ; (14)
3. the fraction of high-type entrepreneurs is su¢ ciently low, given the network size and
the signal structure:
 <
pLy(1  )
(x   y)pH + y(1  )pL : (15)
(a) If the network is su¢ ciently small (i.e.,  < y=x) and (x y)pH+pLy(1 ) > 0,
then all  2 (0; 1) satisfy (15).
(b) If (x   y)pH + pLy(1  ) < 0, then there is no  satisfying (15).
Here, (13)-(15) show the same condition in di¤erent ways. This important proposition,
whose proof is given in Appendix A.1, requires a detailed treatment. The reason for the re-
sults is that the pricing of start-up projects is not rst best. The cross-subsidization induced
by the contractual structure of the credit market results in a redistribution of wealth from the
owners of undervalued start-up projects to the owners of overvalued start-up projects. The
old-boy mechanism can improve the situation by mitigating the adverse selection problem
for some network entrepreneurs. Ex ante, high-type network entrepreneurs have the chance
of getting a good signal with probability x while they may also not get a signal, in which
case their projects are going to be even further undervalued. However, it turns out that, as
long as signals are informative, the former dominates the latter in expected payo¤.
The situation is di¤erent for low-type network entrepreneurs. They always want to
misrepresent themselves as having good projects. Given a network of a xed size and a xed
fraction of high-type entrepreneurs, low-type network entrepreneurs still have a chance to be
labeled with a good signal if the signals are not very informative. This increases the level of
overvaluation to even higher levels. However, if the signals are su¢ ciently informative, they
are more likely to get no signals by the old-boy mechanism, in which case they get loans
with an interest rate of R=~p.
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All else equal, low-type entrepreneurs prefer smaller networks because, even though their
payo¤ realization when they get a good signal and stay in the network is independent of the
network size (which is related to p^, as shown in the rst term of the LHS of (A-3)), their
realized payo¤ in case of no signal (which is related to ~p, as shown in the second term of
LHS of (A-3)) is decreasing in the network size. Thus, their expected payo¤, which is the
weighted average of the previous two realized payo¤s, is also decreasing in the network size.
Consequently, this expected payo¤ becomes higher than their payo¤ without the network
(which is independent of network size) as the network becomes su¢ ciently smaller. Thus,
low-type network entrepreneurs are better o¤ in a su¢ ciently smaller network for any given
signal structure and fraction of high-type entrepreneurs.
Proposition 1 also shows that, all else equal, low-type network entrepreneurs benet
from being in a network when there is a smaller fraction of high-type entrepreneurs in the
population. When there are many high-type entrepreneurs, a low-type entrepreneur will not
benet greatly from being in the network, as in that case p^ will be little greater than p. But if
she does not get a signal, she will have to stand alone outside the network with a signicantly
smaller number of high-type entrepreneurs because many of them will be correctly detected
by the network and so will stay in the network. In this case, ~p will be substantially lower
than p  so the downside is relatively more important in terms of expected payo¤.
In summary, low-type network entrepreneurs are likely to be worse o¤ with the old-boy
mechanism in large networks with an e¤ective signaling structure in societies containing a
larger fraction of high-type entrepreneurs. They are likely to be better o¤ with the old-boy
mechanism in smaller networks with a cumbersome signaling structure in societies containing
a smaller fraction of high-type entrepreneurs.10
It is noteworthy that whether an entrepreneur prefers the old-boy mechanism over no
10Our results do not hinge on the assumption that the fraction of high-type network entrepreneurs is the
same both in and outside the network. Appendix B.1 shows that the same results hold even when the fraction
of high-type network entrepreneurs is higher than the fraction of high-type stand-alone entrepreneurs.
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network is not equivalent to whether an entrepreneur prefers staying in the network or not.
In particular, low-type network entrepreneurs do not want to leave the network even when
they do not want the old-boy mechanism to operate, simply because the expected success
probability of a low-type network entrepreneur in the presence of the old-boy mechanism,
yp^ + (1   y)~p, is always larger than the expected success probability outside the network,
~p, even though the former expression can be larger or smaller than the success probability
without the network, p. Thus, if they leave the network, the success probability outside the
network will be much lower since high-type network entrepreneurs will stay in the network.
This would result in higher loan prices in equilibrium for low-type network entrepreneurs if
they leave the network, which suggests that they want to maintain the networks unity.
Proposition 1 derives preferences at the individual level. The straightforward corollary
to this proposition states the preferences of network entrepreneurs as a group for the case
in which the network is su¢ ciently small. A further proposition will do the same when the
network is large.
Corollary 1 (EntrepreneursDecision as a Group in a Small Network) When the net-
work is small (i.e.,  < [y(pH + (1   )pL)]=[xpH + (1   )ypL]), both high- and low-type
entrepreneurs prefer the old-boy mechanism as a group.
This result says that when there is no conict of interest between high- and low-type
entrepreneurs (i.e., when VH   VH > 0 and VL  VL > 0), the old-boy mechanism maintains
itself easily. The more interesting case, which we will now focus on, is the case in which the
network is su¢ ciently large (i.e.,  > [y(pH + (1  )pL)]=[xpH + (1  )ypL]). In this case,
there is a conict of interest between the two groups of entrepreneurs (i.e., VH   VH > 0 but
VL   VL < 0). A high-type network entrepreneur prefers the old-boy mechanism and thus
is willing to make a side payment to the hub rm to maintain the old-boy mechanism. This
side payment can at most be VH   VH . On the other hand, a low-type network entrepreneur
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does not want the old-boy mechanism and thus is willing to make a side payment to the hub
rm to induce it to dissolve it. This side payment can at most be VL VL.11
Whether the hub rm maintains the old-boy mechanism depends on the total side pay-
ments from both groups of entrepreneurs. Campbell and Kracaw (1980) claim that there
would be no incentives to engage in information extraction in a simple market with informa-
tion asymmetries, a result they call the nonexistence of rational expectations equilibrium.
The basic intuition for the nonexistence result is that, because banks make zero prots, the
overvaluation of the start-ups of low-type entrepreneurs must exactly match with the un-
dervaluation of the start-ups of high-type entrepreneurs in equilibrium. In our setting, the
equalities of overvaluation to undervaluation correspond to the following equalities:
(1  x)(pH   ~p) = (1  )(1  y)(~p  pL) (16)
x(pH   p^) = y(1  )(p^  pL) : (17)
Eq. (16) establishes the cross-subsidization among high- and low-type entrepreneurs
who are either stand-alone or dismissed from the network. (1   ) of the stand-alone
entrepreneurs and (1   x) of the entrepreneurs who are dismissed from the network are
high types, which makes (1   x) in total, as shown on the left-hand side of (16). While
(1 )(1 ) of the stand-alone entrepreneurs and (1 y)(1 ) of the entrepreneurs who are
dismissed from the network are low type, which makes (1  )(1  y) in total, as shown on
the right-hand side of (16). Eq. (17) focuses on the cross-subsidization among the network
entrepreneurs who nance their start-ups with privileged loans (x of them are high-type
entrepreneurs and y(1   ) of them are low-type entrepreneurs). These equations establish
Campbell and Kracaws intuition. However, the crucial points here are that there is no
11A word of caution is required here. The side payment expressions here are in fact average side payments.
Given that there is limited liability, an entrepreneurs side payment can be di¤erent depending on whether
the entrepreneur is in a success or a failure state. However, given that there is a continuum of types, the
Law of Large Numbers applies and we can calculate the total side payments of a group of entrepreneurs from
these average expressions.
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reason to believe that the total amounts of overvaluation and undervaluation among network
entrepreneurs are equal to each other because stand-alone entrepreneurs are naturally not
included in this group, and if it is not so, that there will be market incentives to form the
old-boy mechanism. The following proposition proves that these are in fact the cases.
Proposition 2 (EntrepreneursDecision as a Group in a Large Network) When the
network is large (i.e.;  > [y(pH + (1   )pL)]=[xpH + (1   )ypL]), the total increase in
the market value of the start-ups of high-type network entrepreneurs because of the old-boy
mechanism is higher than the total decrease in the market value of the start-ups of low-type
network entrepreneurs.
The proof is in Appendix A.2. We can now combine all results so far to establish the
market incentives for maintaining an exogenous old-boy mechanism. When the network
is small, all network entrepreneurs want the old-boy mechanism to operate and would be
willing and able to make side payments to the hub rm to maintain it (Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1). When the network is su¢ ciently large, high-type network entrepreneurs are
willing and able to o¤er side payments to the hub rm to induce it to maintain the old-boy
mechanism, and low-type network entrepreneurs are willing and able to o¤er side payments
to the hub rm to dissolve it (Proposition 1). However, what the former group is willing
and able to pay is always larger than what the latter group is willing and able to pay
(Proposition 2). Therefore, regardless of the size of the network, there are incentives to
maintain an exogenous old-boy mechanism in this simple market structure with information
asymmetries. This result is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 (Incentives to Maintain an Old-boy Mechanism) There are market in-
centives for the hub rm to maintain an old-boy mechanism.
This result points to the existence of a surplus (in this case the possibility of side pay-
ments) that can be directed towards maintaining the network. The presence of a surplus
21
means that our results are robust to costs of network membership, provided that the costs
are not prohibitive. Let c > 0 be the cost per network entrepreneur of network membership.
This could be, for example, costs of signal extraction borne by the hub rm; alternatively, it
could be costs of networking needed to remain in a network, that are directly borne by the
members. In either case, provided c  VH   VH , network entrepreneurs with undervalued
projects are willing to use their surplus to defray the cost. Since it has been established that
the total amount of side payments by the network entrepreneurs with undervalued projects
is greater than that by the network entrepreneurs with overvalued projects, there can be
incentives to form and maintain the old-boy mechanism if c  (VH  VH)+(1 )(VL VL).
Thus, our results extend to the case where membership of the network is costly. The impor-
tance of this result is that it shows the possibility that asymmetric information may result
in an ine¢ cient network organization.
Proposition 3 (Ine¢ cient Networking Costs) An old-boy network may entail entrepre-
neurs ine¢ ciently incurring networking costs for purely redistributive private gains as net-
work members.
5 Endogenizing the old-boy network
The analysis so far has assumed that a hub rm exists and that it conveys signals to local
nanciers as outlined in Section 3. This section endogenizes both network membership and
the hub rms signal referral policy by making two assumptions. First, the hub rm is
assumed to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function dened over the set of network
members. This objective function is consistent with the informal nature of the network
based on social contacts, which values all members equally. Below, we will see that the key
results continue to hold even if the hub rm favors high types over low types. Second, we
assume that entrepreneurs di¤er in their networking costs. This assumption seems plausible
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because some entrepreneurs might have friends or family who know the hub rm personally,
and presumably, their networking costs are lower than those of less fortunate entrepreneurs
who have to spend time and money to become acquainted with the hub rm at exclusive
social functions.
If networking costs are incurred, we assume for simplicity that these costs do not need to
be paid again. We also assume that these costs are publicly non-veriable and independent
of investment project type. Unlike the previous section, which simply compared outcomes
when an informal network exists and when it does not, the emphasis now is on entrepreneurs
choosing whether or not to pay a cost to join a network given that other entrepreneurs also
face this choice. So, the ine¢ ciency of the network we mention in Proposition 3 will be more
clearly identied here as the decision to enter the network now becomes a choice variable.
Entrepreneurs compare the payo¤ from network membership, Vi, with the payo¤ from
non-membership, ~Vi. Here, Vi is given by (11) and (12), while
~Vi = pi

Y   R
~p

8i = fH;Lg : (18)
The ~p in this expression di¤ers slightly from that derived in the exogenous case and it will
be dened in (22) below.
Let G(c) denote the distribution function of networking cost c, where G(0) = 0 and
G(1) = 1.12 An entrepreneur is willing to join the network if the cost of joining is not
higher than its benet. Thus, there is a threshold networking cost for each entrepreneur
type, dened by ci = Vi  ~Vi, with which the entrepreneur is indi¤erent between joining the
network or not. Hence, the endogenous network size is given by
 = G(cH) + (1  )G(cL) : (19)
12One may propose considering a refund scheme to reimburse successful entrepreneurs of their entry cost.
But, that would be ideal for formal networks rather than informal ones because in the latter the costs are
more in terms of time and e¤ort than a membership fee.
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If G() is a continuous distribution function, it is straightforward to show that there are more
high-type entrepreneurs than low-type entrepreneurs in the network, i.e., G(cH) > G(c

L). If
G() is discrete, the strict inequality is replaced by a weak inequality.
The payo¤ of a network entrepreneur depends on the information transmitted by the
hub rm to the local nanciers. Let U zi denote the payo¤ of entrepreneur i, given that the
hub rm implements some referral policy z with respect to the information it reveals about
network entrepreneurs to local nanciers. The hub rm does not observe types directly,
so it chooses its referral policy z to maximize the total expected welfare of the network
entrepreneurs, denoted by 
:

 = G(cH)U
z
H + (1  )G(cL)U zL : (20)
There are three salient referral policies:
1. Truthful referral to local nanciers of cases for which good signals are received, but
concealment of cases for which no signal is received.
2. Truthful referral to local nanciers of cases both for which good signals are received and
for which no signal is received.
3. Biased referral to local nanciers, whereby all members are claimed to have received a
good signal even if they received no signal.
Policy 1 is the case discussed in the previous sections. In this case, U1i = Vi in (11) and
(12), where now p^ and ~p are given by
p^ =
G(cH)xpH + (1  )G(cL)ypL
G(cH)x+ (1  )G(cL)y
(21)
~p =
[1  xG(cH)]pH + [1  yG(cL)](1  )pL
[1  xG(cH)] + [1  yG(cL)](1  )
: (22)
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Policy 2 allows local nanciers to distinguish between three groups of borrowers: stand-
alone entrepreneurs, network entrepreneurs with no signal, and network entrepreneurs with a
good signal (see footnote 8). The average success probability of network entrepreneurs with
a good signal continues to be given by p^ provided in (21). However, the success probabilities
of stand-alone entrepreneurs and network entrepreneurs with no signal are given respectively
by
psa =
[1 G(cH)]pH + (1  )[1 G(cL)]pL
[1 G(cH)] + (1  )[1 G(cL)]
(23)
pns =
G(cH)(1  x)pH +G(cL)(1  )(1  y)pL
[G(cH)(1  x) +G(cL)(1  )(1  y)
; (24)
where sa stands for stand alone and ns for no signal. Payo¤s under this referral policy are
given by
U2H =xpH

Y   RI
p^

+ (1  x)pH

Y   RI
pns

(25)
U2L =ypL

Y   RI
p^

+ (1  y)pL

Y   RI
pns

: (26)
Policy 3 has the hub rm telling local nanciers that every member has a good signal. In
that case, because the signal technology is common knowledge, local nanciers will quickly
see through this dissimulation, and consequently, they will price their loans in accordance
with the actual average quality of the borrower pool in the network, not the declared quality
claimed by the hub rm. Thus, the network has no role in project nancing in this case.
We now answer which referral policy is best for the hub rm. Under policy 3, all network
entrepreneurs are o¤ered a loan contract with repayment D = R=p. Hence, U3i = Vi =
pi(Y  D). But, this does not improve on the stand-alone option. Hence, nobody would pay
to join the network, so G(ci ) = 0 for each type and 
 = 0. Next, compare ~p of (22) with
pns. Given G(cH)  G(cL) and x > y, it can be shown that ~p > pns. Hence, 0 < U2i < U1i
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for each type. This means that policy 1 maximizes hub rms objective function. We record
this result in the next lemma.
Lemma 1 The optimal referral policy of the hub rm, whose objective is to maximize the
welfare of the network entrepreneurs, is policy 1.
Lemma 1 shows that the referral policy discussed in Sections 3 and 4 of the paper is
precisely the one which will be chosen by a utilitarian hub rm which cares only about
the payo¤s of its members.13 It can, therefore, be thought of as providing a rationale for
our earlier treatment of old-boy networks. The intuition for Lemma 1 is straightforward:
by identifying network members without a signal, policy 2 e¤ectively labels such members
as having a bad signal. This controverts the hubs wish to promote the interests of all
of its members, unlike policy 1 which gives members lacking signals better terms in the
credit market. Indeed, this result and intuition clearly remain intact even if the hub rm
has a di¤erent objective function which weights high types more than low types. The same
imperative of caring about the outcomes of members lacking signals continues to apply
irrespective of what type the members are and how favored types are by the hub relative to
each other.
If there are multiple hub rms competing with each other, the dominance of policy 1 also
appears to be robust to a less extreme version of policy 3, where a hub rm only modestly
exaggerates the number of good signals. Once again, local nanciers anticipate dissimulation
by the hub rm, and hence price loans accordingly, which reect the quality of the pool they
actually observe.
To see this, suppose a competing hub rm exaggerates good signals, by claiming to
local nanciers that an additional fraction  > 0 (relative to policy 1) of its members have
13In general, it is not possible to extend the probability ordering to include psa. A special case where this
is possible arises when G(cH)  G(cL), for then psa > ~p. Note that psa is not needed to prove Lemma 1
because the hub rm is not interested in the payo¤s of stand-alone entrepreneurs.
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good signals. Given that signal technology is common knowledge, in equilibrium, the local
nanciers price to the average quality of this pool, anticipating that a fraction  of the pool
actually received no signals. They anticipate that the actual average success probability of
this group is
p =
G(cH)[x+ (1  x)]pH + (1  )G(cL)[y + (1  y)]pL
G(cH)[x+ (1  x)] + (1  )G(cL)[y + (1  y)]
: (27)
Now because 1   y > 1   x, p^ of (21) exceeds p. Furthermore, the greater is , the larger
the amount by which p^ exceeds p. Therefore, payo¤s of network entrepreneurs in the good
state  which are disproportionately received by high-type entrepreneurs  are decreasing
in . It follows that competing hub rms with lower  will attract high-type entrepreneurs
away from hub rms with higher . Consequently, hub rms with higher s will end up being
dominated by low-type entrepreneurs, who end up obtaining a higher interest rate than R=p.
Hence, even low-type network entrepreneurs leave those networks. Eventually, only a hub
rm o¤ering  = 0 can retain high-type entrepreneurs and survive in equilibrium. The next
lemma records this result.
Lemma 2 In an environment where multiple networks compete with each other, only the
hub rms which do not exaggerate the number of good signals (i.e. Policies 1 and 2) exist in
equilibrium.
Lemma 2 rules out the possibility of a referral policy which over-claims the number of
good signals, in favor of policy 1 or policy 2. But Lemma 1 has already shown that policy 1
dominates policy 2, conrming the former as the optimal referral policy.
The ine¢ ciency associated with the network, stated in Proposition 3, now becomes clearer
in the context of an endogenously formed network. Remember that in our setting all entre-
preneurs have positive NPV projects. So, it is e¢ cient to undertake all projects and thus
they are going to be nanced in any case. However, in the network regime, network entre-
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preneurs incur networking costs to get a purely redistributive gain in the form of better loan
contract terms. This is ine¢ cient from the point of view of the society. We record this result
in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 (Ine¢ ciency) The network ine¢ ciently forms.
It is noteworthy that the hub rm honestly conveys its information about network entre-
preneurs with a good signal. This means that there are no considerations of nepotism in this
result other than the fact that not sharing the information about those who got no signals
has some favoritism in it. So, even such a network may have negative welfare consequences.
Another important point to note is that, once one incorporates the assumption of het-
erogenous networking costs, the losers from network formation become a much bigger group,
including some high-type entrepreneurs. To make our point, suppose for the moment that
G(cH)  G(cL) so that the fraction of high- and low-type entrepreneurs in and outside the
network are the same, as in the exogenous network model. This allows us to make compar-
isons of some expressions derived in the exogenous network model with others derived in
the endogenous network model. The marginal high type who is indi¤erent between joining
the network and not joining is dened by VH   ~VH = cH . Let us compare her payo¤ when
there is a network, VH , with her payo¤ when there is no network, VH . She would be better
o¤ with a network regime if VH   VH > cH . Incorporating the expression for cH yields
VH   VH > VH   ~VH , or ~VH > VH . This requires ~p > p^, which never holds.
This means that the marginal high-type entrepreneur, who chooses to join the network
at some point, would in fact be better o¤ if there were no network now. One can repeat the
same exercise for a low-type entrepreneur and obtain the same result. So, a positive mass of
network members (composed of both high- and low-type entrepreneurs) whose networking
costs are closer to the marginal networking cost joins the network even though each of them
would be better o¤ in a world with no networks. The next proposition records the result.
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Proposition 5 (Immiserizing Network Membership) A positive mass of high- and low-
type network entrepreneurs would be better o¤ in a world without the network.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes the incentives for the existence of an old-boy network among heteroge-
neous entrepreneurs seeking external nancing. It is not trivial to explain why a network
owner forms an old-boy mechanism to decrease the information gap between network en-
trepreneurs and their nanciers. We show that there can be market incentives to do so.
The previous literature on entrepreneurial nance under asymmetric information has usu-
ally regarded e¤orts to separate hidden types (e.g., via screening or signaling) as conducive
to greater e¢ ciency. Our work contributes to that literature by exploring a novel ine¢ ciency
erected by the informal networks partial separation of hidden entrepreneurial types.
In the presence of asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and their nanciers,
the credit market undervalues the start-ups of high-type entrepreneurs and overvalues the
start-ups of low-type entrepreneurs. When the network owner shares its information about
the entrepreneurs in its network with the nanciers, the levels of under- and overvaluation
are altered for the network entrepreneurs. We show that this makes sometimes both types
of entrepreneurs, and at other times only high-type entrepreneurs, better o¤. In the former
case, as both groups of entrepreneurs are willing and able to provide side payments to the
network owner, it is obvious that there are incentives to maintain the old-boy mechanism.
It also turns out that there are incentives to maintain the old-boy mechanism even in
the latter case, when only high-type entrepreneurs benet so that the interests of the two
types of entrepreneurs conict with each other. This is because the total side payments
that high-type entrepreneurs are willing and able to o¤er to the network owner to induce it
to maintain the old-boy mechanism are greater than the total side payments that low-type
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entrepreneurs are willing and able to pay to the network owner to induce it not to do so. This
suggests that there are market incentives for the network owner to decrease the information
gap between the entrepreneurs and their nanciers. By endogenizing the network, we also
show that the network forms even if it is ine¢ cient because its benet is purely redistributive
while its cost, in the form of networking costs, is real.
Our work can be extended in several directions. If, for example, politicians are also
members of informal networks, they might be able to grease the wheelsof business and
enable co-member entrepreneurs to enjoy benets from network membership which com-
pensate them for having to comply with costly regulations (Meon and Sekkat, 2005). This
could generate e¤ects that are not discussed in this paper. Whether the non-members would
still lose less in aggregate than the members gained might now depend on the nature of the
regulations. A second extension of the model, also in a second-best setting, might combine
hidden actions with hidden types. Non-members might have to expend more privately costly
e¤ort than members to compensate for their group status. If members then responded by
increasing their e¤ort as well to preserve the separation of types a¤orded by the network,
then the overall e¤ect on e¢ ciency might be positive.
Despite the fact that networks and social connections play a great role in many economic
circumstances, there is surprisingly little work in economics on their welfare consequences.
The overwhelming consensus in the existing literature is that social networks have positive
e¤ects in the society, as a conduit for leveraging social capital. For, example, Montgomery
(1991) argues that social networks enhance e¢ ciency by allowing employers to infer hidden
abilities of workers with greater certainty. Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998) and Aldrich and
Zimmer (1986) discuss positive e¤ects of networks in entrepreneurship. In this paper, we
identify a novel channel resulting in negative e¤ects of informal networks even when they
are not nepotistic. The practical implications of this new channel should be embedded into
policy discussions. We hope that future research will further enhance our understanding of
the e¢ ciency and welfare implications of informal networks.
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A Appendix: proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
If the di¤erence between VH and VH is positive, the market value of the start-up of a high-
type network entrepreneur increases due to the old-boy mechanism. That is, VH   VH > 0
should hold. Manipulating this yields
x
p^
+
(1  x)
~p
<
1
p
: (A-1)
By substituting for ~p, p, and p^, we get
(pH   pL) (x  y) (1  )  [xpH(1  ) + (x  y)pL(1  )]
[x+ (1  )y][1  (x+ y(1  ))] > 0 : (A-2)
It can be easily veried that the terms (pH   pL) (x  y) (1  )  and [x + (1   )y] are
positive. The term 1  (x+ y(1  )) is also positive because x+ (1  )y is a weighted
average of x and y, and therefore it is between x and y. Multiplying this by , one gets a
number between x and y, which is denitely less than 1. This means that (A-2) always
holds and therefore the old-boy mechanism always benets a high-type network entrepreneur.
Now, consider a low-type network entrepreneur. The market value of her start-up in-
creases due to the old-boy mechanism if the di¤erence between VL and VL is positive. That
is, VL   VL > 0 should hold. Manipulating this yields
y
p^
+
(1  y)
~p
<
1
p
: (A-3)
By substituting for ~p, p, and p^, we get
(pH   pL) (x  y) (1  )  [(x   y)pH   pLy(1  )(1  )]
[x+ (1  )y][1  (x+ y(1  ))] < 0 : (A-4)
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It can be easily veried that the terms (pH   pL) (x  y) (1  )  and [x + (1   )y] are
positive. Above, we have already shown that 1  (x+ y(1  )) > 0. It is left to determine
when
(x   y)pH   pLy(1  )(1  ) < 0 (A-5)
holds, which yields eqs. (13)-(15). Therefore, the old-boy mechanism benets low-type
network entrepreneurs if x=y < [pH + (1  )(1  )pL]=(pH) (given the network size and
the fraction of high-type entrepreneurs),  < [y(pH + (1  )pL)]=[xpH + (1  )ypL] (given
the signal structure and the fraction of high-type entrepreneurs), and  < [pLy(1 )]=[(x 
y)pH + pLy(1  )] (given the network size and the signal structure).
Note that all  2 (0; 1) satisfy (15) if the network is su¢ ciently small (i.e.,  < y=x) and
(x   y)pH + pLy(1  ) > 0 because in such a case the right-hand side of the inequality is
always greater than 1 (We exclude  = 0 and  = 1 because there would be no asymmetric
information in these cases). If (x  y)pH +pLy(1  ) < 0, then there is no  satisfying (15)
because  cannot be negative.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Since there is a conict of interest in this case, we have VH  VH > 0 for a high-type network
entrepreneur (and there are  of them) but VL VL > 0 for a low-type network entrepreneur
(and there are 1   of them). Hence, the total increase in the value of the start-ups of high-
type entrepreneurs due to the old-boy mechanism is higher than the total decrease in the
value of the start-ups of low-type entrepreneurs as long as 
 VH   VH > (1  )  VL   VL
holds. Expanding this inequality yields


 xpHRI
p^
  (1  x)pHRI
~p
+ pH
RI
p

> (1  )

 pLRI
p
+ ypL
RI
p^
+ (1  y)pLRI
~p

(A-6)
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After substituting for p, ~p, and p^ and simplifying the expression, we get
  (pH   pL)(x  y)(1  )(1  )
pL(1  y)(1  ) + pH(1  x) < 0 : (A-7)
It is obvious that this inequality always holds.
B Appendix: extensions
B.1 Fraction of high-type entrepreneurs in and outside the net-
work
We assume in the exogenous network model that ex ante the fraction of high-type network
entrepreneurs is equal to the fraction of high-type stand-alone entrepreneurs. However, the
endogenous network model showed that there is always a higher fraction of high-type entre-
preneurs in the network than outside it. To show that our results in the exogenous network
model are independent of this assumption, suppose now  fraction of the network entre-
preneurs and  <  fraction of the stand-alone entrepreneurs are high-type entrepreneurs.
Now, there is an additional benet of being in the network for low-type entrepreneurs and
this would strengthen all our results. As stated by Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998), this
assumption is in fact one of the robust empirical observation of the network approach to
entrepreneurship initiated by Aldrich and Zimmer (1986). One can now show that (A-5)
becomes
xpH   [ + (1  )]ypH   pLy(1  )(1  ) < 0: (B-1)
This suggests that, all else equal, low-type entrepreneurs prefer the old-boy mechanism
when  is su¢ ciently low and  is su¢ ciently high. The intuition is similar to what we
provide in the text. When  is su¢ ciently low, it will be relatively close to , which means
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that if a low-type entrepreneur does not get a good signal, she will be relatively less worse
o¤, and if she gets a good signal her project will be even more overvalued compared with
the case in which  is higher. Similarly, when  is higher, the downside is relatively less
important for a low-type entrepreneur because  will be relatively closer to  and thus the
outcome in the case in which she is left out of the network is relatively closer to the case in
which there is no network.
B.2 Reliability of signals
An implicit assumption on which the results are predicated is that the hub rm honestly
conveys the information it has to the local nanciers. In reality, the credibility of the signals
is questionable. One way for local nanciers to overcome this problem is to nance the
start-ups in which the hub rm is also a claimant. That is, if the hub rm claims that the
entrepreneurs it mentions have higher average success probabilities, then it should also be
willing to invest in their projects. Put another way, the signals should be credible if the
hub rm holds a su¢ cient amount of equity in the portfolio of start-ups it labels with good
signals. This appendix shows this result formally.
Suppose the hub rm has (x + (1   )y)W units of capital that it can allocate for
investment in the start-ups of the network entrepreneurs. We assume that this wealth is
observable by local nanciers and that W < I. We also assume that the local nanciers can
verify whether the hub rm in fact invested in the start-ups of the network entrepreneurs.
There are (x + (1   )y) network entrepreneurs that the hub rm labels with a good
signal. An optimal investment strategy for the hub rm is to invest an equal share of its
wealth endowment into these start-ups, which means that it invests W units of capital in
each start-up in its portfolio to get an  < 1 share of each of them.
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If the hub rm extracts the information, its payo¤ is
(x+ (1  )y)[p^(Y  R(I  W )) RW ]  C : (B-2)
The rst term is the net return on investment. It gets an  share of each start-up by
paying W for each. There are (x+ (1  )y) such entrepreneurs and their average success
probability is p^. These entrepreneurs need only I  W units of capital from local nanciers
to start their rms. The second term is the cost to the hub rm of extracting information:
C > 0.
Alternatively, the hub rm can choose [x+ (1  )y] entrepreneurs randomly without
incurring the cost of information extraction and announce them as the ones with good signals
to the local nanciers. If it does that, the average success probability in this random sample
is going to be p < p^. This time, the payo¤ to the hub rm is
(x+ (1  )y)[p(Y  R(I  W )) RW ] : (B-3)
A simple comparison of (B-2) and (B-3) shows that, given W , reporting signals honestly is
preferable by the hub rm if it buys a su¢ ciently large share of each start-up:
 >
C
(x+ (1  )y)(Y  R(I  W ))(p^  p) : (B-4)
This suggests not only that the signals of the hub rm are reliable if it invests in the
portfolio of the start-ups for which it sends good signals to the local nanciers but also that
a hub rm has to have deep pockets to organize a credible old-boy mechanism. Lamoreaux
et al. (2007) provide evidence for both of these conditions. The result of this appendix is
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 (Reliability of Signals) The signals of the hub rm are reliable if it buys
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a su¢ ciently large share of the portfolio of start-ups for which it sends good signals to local
nanciers.
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